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I. INTRODUCTION
While union membership generally has declined since the 1950s, over
the past several years medical professionals have turned to unions and the
union collective bargaining model in record numbers. Reports from union
leaders and American Medical Association (AMA) executives reflect a
250% increase since 1997 in the number of physicians seeking union
membership, 1 and the physician unionization movement is expected to
increase significantly in the coming years in response to the trend toward

• B.A., Union College; J.D., Albany Law School of Union University; LL.M., Yale
University; Labor and Employment Law Associate, Proskauer Rose LL.P.
1. Tanya Albert, More Doctors Following Trend to Unionize, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 27,
2000. An estimated 12,000 to 14,000 doctors belonged to unions in 1997, while recent reports
place that figure at between 45,000 and 47,000 doctors and increasing steadily. Id.; Elizabeth
Thompson Beckley, Strength in Numbers: Employed Physicians Enlist Unions for Bargaining
Clout, MOD. PHYSICIAN, Feb. 2001 ("the general consensus is that union membership among
doctors has increased steadily in the past five years"). A July 9, 1999 Service Employee's
International Union (SEIU) press release claimed that over 4,000 doctors joined the union in the
prior year, available at http://www.seiu.org/media/press_releases/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2002) (on
file with author).
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meeting rule is the law in Florida. That, of course, is exactly what will
happen if the Florida Supreme Court and Legislature do not address this
issue head on. As this Article shows, the legal reasoning and process by
which the per se board meeting rule has been foisted upon the citizens of
Florida is ludicrous. Neither the Florida Supreme Court nor the Legislature
can allow such a situation to stand. Florida's credibility is at stake. 252

252. Getting it right takes heavy lifting by both the Legislature and the judiciary. See State
ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Showers, 398 N. W.2d 154, 165-66 (Wis. 1987) (construing legislation
that attempted to strike a balance between open government and the need for unfettered one-onone consultation among board members); see also Mccomas v. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County,
475 S.E.2d 280, 286-93 (W. Va. 1996).
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While union membership generally has declined since the 1950s, over
the past several years medical professionals have turned to unions and the
union collective bargaining model in record numbers. Reports from union
leaders and American Medical Association (AMA) executives reflect a
250% increase since 1997 in the number of physicians seeking union
membership, 1 and the physician unionization movement is expected to
increase significantly in the coming years in response to the trend toward

• B.A., Union College; J.D., Albany Law School of Union University; LL.M., Yale
University; Labor and Employment Law Associate, Proskauer Rose LL.P.
1. Tanya Albert, More Doctors Following Trend to Unionize, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 27,
2000. An estimated 12,000 to 14,000 doctors belonged to unions in 1997, while recent reports
place that figure at between 45,000 and 47,000 doctors and increasing steadily. Id; Elizabeth
Thompson Beckley, Strength in Numbers: Employed Physicians Enlist Unions for Bargaining
Clout, MOD. PHYSICIAN, Feb. 2001 ("the general consensus is that union membership among
doctors has increased steadily in the past five years"). A July 9, 1999 Service Employee's
International Union (SEIU) press release claimed that over 4,000 doctors joined the union in the
prior year, available at http://www.seiu.org/media/press_releases/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2002) (on
file with author).
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managed care. Currently, approximately 45,000 doctors are union
members. It is estimated that forty-three percent ofphysicians are currently
employed, primarily by a group practice, private hospital, medical school,
or the government, representing a ten percent increase since 1983.2
Younger physicians, who are more likely to be employees than independent
practitioners, 3 have expressed particular interest in unionization.
Doctors are turning to the union model to give themselves leverage in
the new managed care environment. Previously, physicians in private
practice enjoyed complete autonomy over the provision of patient care. 4
Insurance companies deferred to the judgments of physicians and paid for
whatever services the physicians deemed necessary on a fee-for-service
basis. 5 In the 1970s and 1980s, skyrocketing health care costs and health
insurance premiums prompted an employer and health care consumer
demand for an alternative system that would ensure greater cost
accountability. 6 Consequently, the managed care system, under which
physicians' medical decisions, practices, and procedures are reviewed and
shaped by health care managers in the interest of cost efficiency, has largely
replaced the insurance indemnification system. 7 Doctors are "mad as hell"
about this dramatic alteration in their relationship with their patients and
insurers so they are turning to unions, in part, because of a perception that
nothing else works. 8
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), most doctors do not
have a legally protected right to unionize because the NLRA only applies
to employees and does not include independent contractors like doctors

2. Craig Havighurst, A Union Answer, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 11, 1999; Beckley, supra
note 1.
3. The AMA reports that about seventy percent of all residency graduates entered salaried
positions in 1997. See Molly Tschinda, Nation's Largest Physician Union Forms Under SEJU
Umbrella, MOD. PHYSICIAN, Mar. 2000. The AMA-formed union, Physicians for Responsible
Negotiation, placed that figure at nearly ninety percent for doctors completing their residency in
2001. Beckley, supra note 1.
4. AmeriHealth, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Oct. 18, 1999); Lisa M. Nijm & Bryan A.
Liong, Physician Unionization: White Coats with Blue Collars?, HOSP. PHYSICIAN, May 2001, at
71.
5. AmeriHealth, 1999 WL 963200, at *4; Nijm & Liong, supra note 4.
6. AmeriHealth, 1999 WL 963200, at *4.
1. Id. Approximately thirty-five percent of American insured patients are enrolled in health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), which deliver a comprehensive set of health care services
through a closed panel of medical providers. Id.
8. Diane M. Gianelli, Delegates Say AMA Must Do More to F osier Collective Bargaining,
AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 4, 1999; see Havighurst, supra note 2; Tom Abate, Doctors Examine Union
Option, Physicians Are Beginning to Band Together- and HMOs are Worried, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 3, 1999.
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who operate private practices. 9 Moreover, prior to late 1999, the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had construed the NLRA as inapplicable
to housestaff - medical interns, residents, and fellows who work in
hospitals on an essentially full-time basis as part of their advanced medical
training - because housestaff were primarily viewed as students, not
employees. 10
Given the limitations of the NLRA, doctors have pursued their
organizing efforts on multiple fronts. Some doctors who fall within the
definition of employees have formed their own unions, affiliating with the
AFL-CIO and other traditional labor organizations. Also, in response to
increasing pressure and vociferous demands by its members, the AMA
recently created an independent organization, Physicians for Responsible
Negotiation, to organize and assist doctors in collective bargaining using
a new model of professional unionization. At the same time, in order to
address the needs of the many doctors who fall outside the protection of the
NLRA, the AMA has actively lobbied Congress in support of an
amendment to the antitrust laws that would permit doctors to collectively
bargain with health plan providers and insurers. Finally, the unionization
movement is expected to expand dramatically at the housestaff level as a
result of a recent NLRB decision which reversed long-standing precedent
by holding that housestaff are employees within the meaning of the NLRA.
With the exception of grievances from notoriously underpaid and
overworked housestaff, much of the medical profession's rhetoric in
support of unionization and collective bargaining rights has focused on
patient care issues. Doctors claim that they need to be able to bargain
collectively with managed care providers because their excessive and overly
restrictive regulations hurt the quality of patient care. However,
traditionally collective bargaining has focused on issues relating to wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment, not consumer safety.
Ultimately, patients may derive few benefits from physician unionization.
Section II of this Article reviews the NLRA definition of employee and
its application to doctors. Section III addresses the unionization of salaried
physicians, while section IV examines the movement for a legislative
exemption from the antitrust laws, which would enable doctors to bargain
collectively. Section V outlines the cases related to the unionization of
housestaff and the implications of the NLRB' s recent reversal of position.

9. 29 u.s.c. § 152(3)(2001).
10. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
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In conclusion, section VI analyzes the implications of physician
unionization in terms of bargainable issues, and the likelihood that
bargaining will include patient care issues.
II. APPLICATION OF THE NLRA TO DOCTORS
To distinguish between employees, who are covered by the NLRA, and
independent contractors, who do not receive NLRA protection, the NLRB
and the courts have borrowed master-servant and agency principles from
the common law and have considered a variety of factors. 11 Employee
status may be established based on the following: the extent of control
exercised over the details of the work; the employment's distinctiveness as
an occupation or business; the specialized nature of the work; the skills
required; the supplier of the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work; the
duration of employment; the method of payment for services (by job or by
time); the finding that the work is part of the regular business of the
employer; the parties' intent in creating their relationship; and the
principal's role in the business. 12 All of these factors must be carefully
considered, not just those pertaining to a right of control. 13
Although conventionally self-employed doctors in individual or group
practices have been classified as independent contractors, a group of
physicians serving members of an HMO in New Jersey recently challenged
that classification, arguing that the controls imposed by managed care
providers created a relationship comparable to the employer-employee
relationship. In AmeriHealth, Inc., 14 the United Food and Commercial
Workers Union Local 56 sought to represent a bargaining unit of 652
primary and specialty physicians serving AmeriHealth HMO members in
Atlantic and Cape May Counties, New Jersey. The NLRB upheld a
determination that the physicians were independent contractors and thus fell
outside the scope of the NLRA. 15
In petitioning for representation, the physicians claimed that
AmeriHealth controlled their access to, and relationships with, their

11. N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 93-95 (1995).
12. AmeriHealth, 1999 WL 963200, at *26.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *32. The Regional Director had originally administratively dismissed the petition

on the grounds that the doctors were independent contractors. Finding that the petition concerned
an "important issue of first impression," the Board reinstated the petition and remanded for a full
hearing. Following 14 days of hearings in November and December 1998, the hearing officer
concluded that the doctors were independent contractors and dismissed the petition. Id. at *2.
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patients, and argued that they lacked meaningful opportunities to negotiate
with AmeriHealth about the terms of their contracts and the fees paid for
their services. 16 The Regional Director for NLRB Region 22 found that the
record did not support these allegations. With regard to access to patients,
the regional director noted that AmeriHealth members comprised a small
portion of each participating physician's patient base, that the HMO did not
place any restrictions on competition with other health plans or insurers,
and that physicians freely engaged in their own marketing efforts. 17 In
addition, participating physicians maintained identities separate from
AmeriHealth, purchased their own medical malpractice insurance, employed
their own staff, made their own business investment decisions, and could
structure their practices as they chose, as long as they maintained admission
privileges at one participating hospital. 18 Also, the physicians chose their
own facilities, equipment, and work hours, subject to minimum standards
set by AmeriHealth. 19
Furthermore, the regional director found insufficient evidence that
AmeriHealth regulated the physician-patient relationship in a manner
comparable to that of an employer. All participating physicians received a
Physicians' Office Manual, which contained practice guidelines for certain
types of care that largely conformed with standard medical guidelines. 20
Procedurally, AmeriHealth required patients to obtain a referral from their
primary care provider before receiving specialized services and generally
restricted referrals to network providers. 21 AmeriHealth also required that
certain outpatient services, like lab work and radiology, be referred to
capitated providers and that a limited number ofprocedures be pre-certified
as medically necessary. 22 Finally, physicians were expected to comply with
a Prescription Drug Formulary for dispensing outpatient medication. 23
The HMO evaluated participating physicians annually by reviewing their
patient records, referral patterns, and compliance with pre-certification
requirements and AmeriHealth guidelines. 24 Physicians who failed to meet
AmeriHealth' s standards would receive improvement plans and their service
contracts could be terminated (although AmeriHealth had never actually

16.
11.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at *29-30.
AmeriHea/th, 1999 WL 963200, at *8.
Id. at *9-10.
Id.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *17, *20.
AmeriHealth, 1999 WL 963200, at *18-19.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *28.
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terminated a contract on that basis). 25 Physicians had to be certified by
AmeriHealth as meeting minimum standards with regard to medical training
and experience and were recertified biannually. 26 The regional director
observed that while New Jersey required HMOs to establish and implement
a comprehensive utilization management program, to certify and recertify
participating physicians, and to maintain performance review procedures,
state law did not specify the content of these programs or procedures. 27
On balance, the regional director concluded that AmeriHealth did not
closely monitor and regulate individual physicians' medical practices. He
noted that AmeriHealth representatives visited physicians' offices for just
a few hours once each year or two to conduct random spot checks of
patient records, but that AmeriHealth standards and guidelines did not
attempt to control the manner in which medical procedures were actually
performed. 28 Similarly, although physicians were required to provide
services with the same standard of care, skill, and diligence customary to
physicians in the community, AmeriHealth did not attempt to define or
enforce that standard. 29 In addition, while AmeriHealth determined the sites
for certain services and imposed pre-certification requirements for some
procedures, most procedures did not require pre-certification. 30
Finally, the regional director concluded that participants could negotiate
terms and service fees in their contracts. 31 Ten percent of participating
physicians had negotiated "special pricing arrangements" with AmeriHealth
and between two and five percent had negotiated modifications to certain
provisions of their contracts. 32 The regional director observed that the
freedom to negotiate did not become illusory simply because some offers
to negotiate had been rejected. 33
The regional director analogized the relationship of physicians with
AmeriHealth to the relationship between freelance advertising
photographers and an advertising agency, as considered by the NLRB in
Young & Rubicam International. 34 In Young, the NLRB held that highly
skilled photographers who rented and maintained their own facilities,
invested in expensive equipment, employed their own employees,

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at *11-13.
AmeriHealth, 1999 WL 963200, at *23-24, *28.
Id. at *28.

Id.
Id. at *29.
Id. at *30.
AmeriHealth, 1999 WL 963200, at *24-25, *30-31.
Id. at *30.
Id. at *3 l; Young & Rubicam Int'l, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1976).
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incorporated as businesses, advertised to promote their businesses, and
received a flat fee from the advertising agency were independent
contractors, despite the close monitoring and supervision of their work by
art directors for the advertising agency. 35
The NLRB agreed with the regional director's analogy in Young. 36
However, the NLRB minimized the regional director's reliance on the
absence ofevidence that AmeriHealth exercised substantial control over the
physicians' physical conduct and the lack ofon-site supervision, finding that
it was not customary for the physical conduct of participating physicians to
be subject to substantial control and that their performance was monitored
using a variety of off-site techniques. 37 The NLRB based its affirmance on
its consideration of the factors of the common law agency test, but
observed that the holding was "not necessarily precluding a finding that
physicians under contract to health maintenance organizations may, in other
circumstances, be found to be statutory employees." 38
Thus, it is still possible for self-employed physicians to secure coverage
under the NLRA, provided that they can demonstrate that their contracts
with an HMO subject them to additional constraints with regard to patient
care issues beyond those identified in AmeriHealth and that they have no
actual ability to negotiate the terms of their contracts. Without such an
extreme level of control by the HMO, however, it appears likely that these
physicians will fall outside the scope of the NLRA. In contrast, for those
physicians working as staff in hospitals, clinics, and other settings, thereby
falling within the traditional definition of employees, unionization is a viable
and legally protected option.

Ill. UNIONIZATION EFFORTS AMONG PHYSICIANS
The unionization movement among doctors dates bacl~ to June 1972,
when AMA delegates called for a study of the issues involved in collective
bargaining. 39 The AMA Board of Trustees recommended that organizing
efforts be channeled through medical societies, and the issue remained
dormant within the AMA until June 1984, when the House of Delegates
called upon the AMA to study means by which physicians could be

35. Young & Rubicam, 226 N.L.R.B. at 1277.
36. AmeriHedlth, 1999 WL 963200, at * l.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Sarah A. Klein, AMA Board Balks at Bargaining Unit Plan, AM. MED. NEWS, May 3,
1999.
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represented on issues ofquality, access, and reimbursement. 40 After several
years of study and discussion, the House of Delegates rejected an AMA
proposal for the development of a collective bargaining unit and the issue
largely died, until delegates to the AMA' s annual meeting in June 1997
called for an AMA investigation of collective bargaining for employed
physicians. 41
Managed care's resulting reduction of reimbursement rates and
application ofjob performance measures has fueled physicians' most recent
demands for unions as a means to strengthen their negotiating power. 42 This
time, in response to increasing pressure, especially from younger physicians
and medical residents43 at its June 1999 meeting, the AMA voted to
develop an affiliated national labor organization to represent employed
physicians and, to the extent allowed by law, residents. 44
Despite a June 1998 mandate to develop a union, the AMA Board of
Trustees had resisted organizing efforts because of concerns that an AMAsponsored union was inappropriate and would aversely affect the
perception of the public with regard to the medical profession. 45 In a
seventy-three page report addressing the collective bargaining proposal, the
AMA expressed concerns that a collective bargaining unit could only
represent a fraction of AMA constituents because it would not apply to
housestaff or self-employed doctors, who are most in need of enhanced

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Havighurst, supra note 2.
43. Klein, supra note 39.
44. Press Release, American Medical Association, AMA Physicians Vote to Form National
Negotiating Organization (June 23, 1999), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/1616.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2002). At that time, controlling NLRB case law precluded
medical residents from claiming employee status. See infra text accompanying notes 112-19. That
decision was reversed a year later in Boston Medical Center Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
45. Klein, supra note 39.
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bargaining strength. 46 The AMA was equally concerned that early
organizing failures could ruin the AMA' s a4vocacy image, especially in
light of its lack of experience and no-strike policy, and that its reputation
as a professional organization would be placed at risk while it endeavored
to form a unit that was simultaneously effective and professional.47
In an effort to address both of these concerns, despite the 1998
unionization mandate, the AMA House of Delegates voted to continue
lobbying efforts in support of legislation that would exempt health care
professionals from federal antitrust laws, allowing collective bargaining
with health plan providers and insurers. The House of Delegates also voted
in support of a directive that all AMA activities regarding physician
negotiation maintain the highest levels of professionalism consistent with
the AMA' s Principles of Medical Ethics and the Current Opinions of the
AMA' s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. 48 The AMA pledged that
its union would be different from a traditional labor union because of its
degree of independence, its no-strike pledge, and its commitment to
medical ethics.49
Following the landmark vote of June 1999, the AMA created an
independent labor organization entitled Physicians for Responsible
Negotiations (PRN). 50 The AMA also provided an initial 1.2 million dollar
loan to support PRN operations through December 31, 200051 and a model
constitution, which was largely adopted by PRN's governing body (which
was initially appointed by the AMA Board of Trustees). The constitution·

46. Sarah A. Klein, Board Details Discomfort with Collective Bargaining, AM. MED. NEWS,
June 21, 1999. AMA leaders reportedly estimated that out of the 620,000 doctors directly involved
in patient care, a union could assist up to 108,000 (17%) of the nation's physicians. Sarah A.
Klein, AMA to Establish National Collective Bargaining Unit, AM. MED. NEWS, July 5, 1999;
Editorial, Loud Message in Physician Organizing Vote, AM. MED. NEWS, July 19, 1999. These
small figures are not readily reconciled with other AMA reports estimating that 64% of all
licensed physicians in the United States are self-employed, while the remaining 36% are
employees (26.6% are employees of hospitals and other medical institutions and 9.4% are
employees of doctor owned groups). Klein, supra note 39. Nor are the figures reconciled with an
earlier estimate placing the percentage of doctors eligible for union members (excluding residents
and federal employees) at 43%. Havighurst, supra note 2; Sarah A. Klein, Alliance of Physician
Unions Creates New Collective Bargaining Powerhouse, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 15, 1999.
47. Klein, supra note 39.
48. American Medical Association, supra note 44.
49. Id.
50. Press Release, American Medical Association, AMA Announces Next Steps in Creating
a National Negotiating Organization for Employed Physicians (Sept. 9, 1999), available at
http://ama-assn.org/ad-com/releases/1999/pmextstep.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2002).
51. Report of the Board of Trustees, Regarding Physicians of Responsible Negotiations
13-1-99 (1999).
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"stresses an overriding commitment to the promotion of quality healthcare
and ties the operating philosophies of PRN" to principles of medical
ethics. 52
Consistent with the AMA pledge, PRN' s constitution precludes strikes
or other job actions. To further distinguish itselffrom other traditional labor
unions, PRN limits its membership to physicians and disclaims the closed
shop model of mandatory union membership. 53 The organizing model
developed by PRN calls for an initial education/fact-finding phase to be
conducted by the AMA in conjunction with the appropriate local medical
society, and is designed to convey to the physician the necessary emotional
and financial commitment, as well as the limits of the no-strike model. 54
Those physicians who remain committed to unionization are then
authorized to contact PRN for assistance, provided that a core group of
physician leaders makes a financial commitment to the organization effort.
PRN also assists recognized bargaining units during contract negotiations
and contract administration. 55
PRN initiated its organizing efforts with a group of forty-two staff
physicians employed by Wellness Plan in Detroit, a mixed-model HMO that
was founded in 1972 to bring state-of-the- art clinics to the urban
population following a race riot. 56 In response to two years of significant
reductions in state funds and the resulting structural and operational
changes, the staff physicians turned to unionization to ensure their say in
the plan's future. 57 The issues on the bargaining table included a patients'
rights clause, grievance procedures, job security, a joint medical/staff
committee structure, and economic concerns. 58 The contract negotiated by
PRN was ratified on March 15, 2001. 59

52. Id.
53. PRN as Your Collective Bargaining Representative, available at http://www.4pm.org/
montegiore/pm_as_rep.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002).
54. Sarah A. Klein, AMA Bargaining Unit: From Concept to Reality, AM. MED. NEWS, July
26, 1999; Report of the Board of Trustees, supra note 51, at 2.
55. See Id.
56. Sarah A. Klein, PRN Takes on its Initial Bargaining Assignment, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan.
24, 2000. A petition for representation was filed with the NLRB in late Dec. 1999. Id.
51. Id. The doctors had been meeting with the United Auto Workers union to discuss
organizing before PRN was established and elected to switch to a doctor-based union.
58. Letter from Jill Poznick, Director, Field Operations, to New Jersey physicians (Sept. 25,
2000), available at http://www.4pm.org/concentra/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2002).
59. Physician's Union Forges Ahead Successfully, Despite Roadblocks, PHYSICIAN'S
WKLY., Jan. 22, 2001; AMA Bargaining Arm Wins First Contract with an HMO, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING BULL. (BNA), Apr. 5, 2001 (on file with author); Tanya Albert, New York Interns,
Residents Get NLRB Nod to Join Union, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 16, 2001. PRN also affiliated with
an existing independent labor organization representing twenty emergency medicine physicians
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PRN also filed a petition in August 2000 on behalf of approximately
nineteen occupational medicine physicians employed at ten Concentra
Managed Care, Inc. clinics in New Jersey .60 Concentra filed various
objections to the petition and the scope of the bargaining unit. 61 Resolution
of those objections and further organizing efforts among private physicians
were delayed as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision
in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care. 62 In that case, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the NLRB had misinterpreted the NLRA and that
individuals who "exercise 'ordinary professional or technical judgment in
directing less-skilled employees to deliver services"' may be supervisors
and are not protected by the NLRA. 63 The Kentucky River decision led
PRN and others to question whether privately employed physicians would
also be considered supervisors and thereby fall outside the scope of the
NLRA. 64 Reconsidering PRN' s petition to represent the Concentra doctors
in New Jersey under the Kentucky River decision, the Regional Director for
NLRB Region 22 recently concluded that the petitioning doctors were
employees, not supervisors.65 Concentra has requested review of that
determination by the NLRB.66
While the AMA deliberated over whether to enter the unionization
movement, some doctors independently formed their own unions in
affiliation with traditional, industrial labor unions. The oldest union of
doctors, the Doctors Council, was formed in 197 5 to represent physicians,
dentists, and podiatrists in the New York City area. On March 1, 1999, the
Doctors Council joined a union of medical housestaff, entitled the
Committee of Interns and Residents, and United Salaried Physicians and
Dentists to form the National Doctors Alliance, a 15,000 member organized

in Austin, Texas. How Much Damage Did Supreme Court Ruling Do to Health Care
Unionization?, MANAGED CARE, Aug.2001 (on file with author); Trebor Banstetter, Area Doctors
Likely to Unionize Some Experts Say; An Austin Physicians Group's Vote to Join a National
Labor Organization is Not Expected to be the Last in Texas, STAR TELEGRAM, Apr. 17, 2001 (on
file with author).
60. Occupational Health Ctrs. of New Jersey d/b/a Concentra Medical Ctrs., Supp. Dec. &
Order, No. 22-RC-11944, available at http://www.4pm.org/pdf/nlrb_20020l3l.pdf(last visited
Apr. 1, 2002).
61. Id.
62. Tanya Albert, Supreme Court Decision Expands Definition of "Supervisor," AM. MED.
NEWS, June 25, 2001; N.L.R.B. v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
63. Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 713-14 (citation omitted).
64. Albert, supra note 62.
65. Occupational Health Ctrs., supra note 60.
66. See http://www.4pm.org/pdf/brief20020308.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
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union of salaried physicians and dentists affiliated with the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU), AFL-CIO. 67
Unlike PRN, which actively seeks to disassociate itself from the
traditional union model and disclaims a primary interest in worker issues
such as pay, hours, and benefits,68 the National Doctors Alliance and other
unions of doctors, such as the Federation of Physicians and Dentists (8500
members) and the Union of American Physicians and Dentists (6000
members), have affiliated with industrial unions and embraced all the tools
afforded unions under the NLRA, including the right to strike. 69 These
unions concede that patient care is not the sole focus of their collective
bargaining efforts. Rather, the agendas include negotiations over salaries,
hours, and due process, while patient advocacy is addressed primarily
through legislative drives for managed care reform. 70 According to Doctors
Council President Dr. Barry Liebowitz, strikes may be appropriate to
prevent cost-cutting measures which would affect the quality of patient
care, such as the closure of a cardiology or neurology department, but not
for purely economic issues. 71
Thus, at least in principle, PRN represents a new approach to
unionization. As discussed in section VI, however, it remains to be seen
whether and to what extent collective bargaining can achieve changes in
consumer safety matters such as patient care. Ultimately, despite its
professed alternative approach, PRN may simply serve as another group
through which staff physicians can bargain over wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment without utilizing the economic threat
of a strike.
IV. ANTITRUST EXEMPTION FOR SELF-EMPLOYED DOCTORS
Under federal antitrust laws, the ability of self-employed private
practitioners to organize and negotiate collectively with HMOs and
insurance companies is limited. 72 Frustrated with the managed care system
and with limitations on their autonomy, these doctors are seeking a

67. Diane E. Lewis, Doctors Join Union to Fight Ills From HMOs, B. GLOBE, Mar. 2, 1999,
at Al.
68. Klein, supra note 39.
69. Id.; Molly Tschida, Nation's Largest Physician Union Forms Under SEJU Umbrella,
MOD. PHYSICIAN, Mar. 2000; Abate, supra note 8.
70. Klein, supra note 39; Lewis, supra note 67.
71. Steven Greenhouse, Doctors· Group Merges With a Larger Union, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 1999.
72. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1, 2, 12.
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legislative exemption from the constraints of federal antitrust laws for
health care providers. Such an exemption was embodied in the Quality
Health Care Coalition Act of 1999 (House Bill 1304), which passed the
House by a 2: 1 vote margin in June 2000, but was never considered by the
Senate and died at the end of the session. 73 The AMA pressed for similar
legislation in the 107th Congress, and House Bill 3897, the Health Care
Antitrust Improvements Act of2002, sponsored by Congressmen Bob Barr
(R-GA) and John Conyers (D-MI), was introduced on March 7, 2002. 74
As passed by the House, House Bill 1304 granted an exemption from
the antitrust laws to health care professionals engaged in negotiations with
health plan providers which was identical to that granted to unions
negotiating with employers under the NLRA. 75 The bill provided that in
connection with such negotiations, the health care professional was to be
treated "as an employee engaged in concerted activities,"76 with the limited
exception that the health care professional would be precluded from
participating "in any collective cessation of service to patients not otherwise
permitted by existing law. ,m In response to criticisms that physicians would
use the bill as a vehicle for increasing reimbursement rates that would raise
costs for consumers, the bill included a three-year sunset provision and
directed the General Accounting Office to conduct a six-month study ofthe
effects of the legislation. 78
The AMA argues that antitrust legislation is necessary because the
market is dominated by a few large insurers and nearly eighty percent of
Americans receive their health care coverage from a managed care plan. 79

73. H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (2000).
74. Tanya Albert, Collective Bargaining Bill Needs Senate Nod, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 15,
2001; Tanya Albert, Collective Bargaining Bill Dies; Supporters Vow to Try Again, AM. MED.
NEWS, Nov. 6, 2000.
75. H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (2000).
16. Id. § 2(a).
77. Id. § 2(c)(l).
78. Id. § 2(d), (h); 146 CONG. REC. H5627, H5639 (daily ed. June 29, 2000) (statement of
Rep. Conyers) (citing the three-year sunset provision as obviating the need for any further
oversight); 146 CONG. REC. at H5632 (June 29, 2000) (statement of Rep. Pomeroy) (recognizing
the Judiciary Committee adopted the sunset provision in response to concerns of rising costs to
consumers).
79. AMA Questions and Answers on H.R. 1304, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/basic/article/201-561-0.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2002); E. Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., MD,
Statement of the American Medical Association to the Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of
Representatives Re: In Support of the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999, H.R. 1304 (June
22, 1999) (noting that the Aetna/U.S. Healthcare merger with Prudential will make Aetna one of
the three top insurers in nine states and give Aetna control of between 30-59% of the HMO
market in certain counties and cities).
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The AMA claims that under these circumstances, few doctors can afford
not to contract with health plans and are virtually compelled to consent to
onerous contract provisions. 80 Such provisions, the AMA asserts, have
compromised the ability of doctors to make decisions for their patients.
They view an antitrust exemption as the only way to level the playing
field. 81 As a further example of disparities in bargaining power, the AMA
claims that under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015,
health insurers enjoy a special exemption under the antitrust laws and are
permitted to share actuarial data and price information with their
competitors, while physicians are precluded from exchanging this type of
information. 82
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), as well as various coalitions of health plan providers, collectively
oppose the physician antitrust exemption. The DOJ and the FTC dispute
the AMA' s claim to need an equalization of power and argue that the
public benefits the most from a competitive marketplace policed by the
government under existing antitrust laws and measures, such as a Patients
Bill of Rights, designed to empower consumer choice. 83 Both government
entities disclaim the AMA' s assertion that mergers ofhealth plan providers
in recent years have resulted in the domination ofthe marketplace by a halfdozen insurance providers. The DOJ notes that between 1994 and 1997,
150 new HMOs were licensed across the country, and the market share of
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, which once dominated the health care industry,
has been eroded by managed care plans. 84 As evidence that existing
government scrutiny adequately protects the public and health care
providers against anti-competitive action, the DOJ cites its intervention in
the proposed merger of Aetna and Prudential, where substantial divestitures
were required in Dallas and Houston based on concerns that merger in
those two markets would lead to market power in the sale of HMO services
and the purchase of doctors' services. 85

80. Anderson, supra note 79.
81. Id.

82. Id
83. The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the
House Judiciary Comm. ( 1999) (statement of Joel I. Klein, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep 't of Justice); The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of1999: Hearing on H. R. 1304 Before
the House Judiciary Comm. (1999) (statement presented by Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed.
Trade Comm'n).
84. Klein, supra note 83.
85. Id. The AMA counters that the Aetna merger was the first significant review of a health
plan merger ever conducted by the OOJ or the FTC, and asserts that the government has been far
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The DOJ and the FTC dismiss the McCarran-Ferguson Act as
essentially a red herring, noting that under long-standing U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, the Act provides insurers with a limited exemption from
the antitrust laws in connection with "the business of insurance" that does
not extend to the dealings ofinsurers with health care providers. 86 The DOJ
observes that it has policed insurers' exclusionary or collusive activities
with regard to contractual provisions imposed on health care providers. 87
One ofthe DOJ' sand the FTC' s greatest concerns with House Bill 1304
was that it offered no protective mechanisms to guarantee that negotiations
would focus on improving the quality of care rather than on the personal
financial circumstances of doctors. The entities expressed the fear that the
public will ultimately suffer as a result of cost increases that would be
passed on to consumers and taxpayers. In their testimony before Congress,
both entities cited cases they had investigated, in which doctors jointly
negotiating with health insurers had sought significant fee increases
(sometimes as much as forty percent), in some cases while professing to be
motivated by quality of care concerns. 88 Citing standard economic theory,
the DOJ and the FTC noted that an increase in the cost of an input
ordinarily translates into a higher output price, and insurers are virtually

more ardent in its efforts to police doctors in their exchange of information about proposed health
plan contracts. Anderson, supra note 79.
86. Klein, supra note 83.
87. Id.
88. Id. The FTC cited the Commission's recent intervention where a group representing 7080% of the physicians in the Lake Tahoe area were forcing all the area health plans to accept
much higher rates than those paid in other parts of California or Nevada or find other doctors with
whom to contract Pitofsky, supra note 83. The FTC also cited a consent order settling charges that
a group of physicians in Danville, Virginia had agreed on reimbursement rates and other terms
of dealing with health plans and had agreed to boycott those plans that did not meet their terms,
thereby obstructing the entry of new health care plans into the area. The Virginia case had been
jointly investigated with the Commonwealth of Virginia because one of the victims of the boycott
was a health plan for state employees. Id. The FTC and Virginia collected $170,000 in penalties
and damages for the increased costs the state claimed it had to bear in providing health benefits
to its employees. Id. Similarly, the DOJ cited the Federation of Certified Surgeons and Specialists
case, in which 29 doctors comprising the vast majority of general and vascular surgeons with
operating privileges at five Tampa hospitals formed a corporation to jointly negotiate higher fees
from managed care plans and obtained an average of$14,000 each in additional annual revenues.
Klein, supra note 83. The DOJ also cited the Federation of Physicians and Dentists case in which
it alleges that most of the orthopedic surgeons in Delaware agreed to boycott Blue Cross and Blue
Shield after it announced it was going to reduce reimbursement rates, even though those rates
were still higher than those paid to orthopedic surgeons in neighboring Philadelphia and were in
line with fees paid to other types of specialists in Delaware. Id.
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certain to pass most of the increased cost of covered services on to
consumers. 89 The only alternative to increasing costs is a reduction of
covered services, which would be equally detrimental to consumers.90
Similar concerns prompted several members of Congress to propose
amendments to House Bill 1304 in order to guarantee that negotiations
would focus on patient care issues. Proposals by Congressmen Ballenger
and Terry would have excluded fee, payment, or reimbursement
negotiations from the antitrust exemption,91 while a proposal by
Congressman Stearns required that health care professionals seeking to
negotiate first obtain approval from the FTC or the Assistant Attorney
General, ensuring that the negotiations would "promote competition and
enhance the quality of patient care."92 All of these proposals were soundly
defeated during the floor debate on the bill. 93
The objections of the DOJ and the FTC appear to stem largely from a
concern that was scarcely addressed at the House Judiciary Committee
hearings on the bill-the application of the labor law collective bargaining
model to negotiations conducted outside the strictures of the NLRA. 94
House Bill 1304 provided that health care professionals negotiating with
health plan providers regarding contract terms for the provision of health
care items or services were to be treated as "employees engaged in
concerted activities," exempt from the antitrust laws to the same extent as

89. Klein, supra note 83; Pitofsky, supra note 83. The DOJ notes that costs for professional
services ordinarily constitute 40-50% of a health plan's total costs and for the last few years
premiums have closely reflected the costs of insurers. Klein, supra note 83. The AMA counters
that this is all a smokescreen because overhead accounts for as much as 20-25% of insurance
premiums and insurers could absorb more of the costs that they currently pass on to consumers.
AMA Questions and Answers, supra note 79.
90. See Pitofsky, supra note 83; Klein, supra note 83.
91. H. Arndt. 952, CONG. REC. H5637 (June 30, 2000). The Ballenger Amendment would
also have barred negotiations to permit health care professionals to balance bill patients, required
health care professionals to develop plans to identify and reduce the incidence of medical errors,
required health care professionals to disclose to patients and prospective patients their
participation in negotiations and prohibited boycotts. Id. The Terry Amendment simply excluded
"negotiations over fees" from the exemption. H. Arndt. 955, CONG. REC. H5643 (June 30, 2000).
92. H. Arndt. 953, CONG. REC. H5639 (June 30, 2000).
93. CONG. REC. H5648-51 (June 30, 2000).
94. Testimony submitted by the National Guild of Medical Professionals simply stated that
negotiations are not limited to pay-related issues and may "address the entire scope of activities
that have resulted in the patient outcry that drives this hearing." Testimony Offered by the
National Guild of Medical Professionals, Office and Professional Employees International Union
AFL-CIO before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in Reference to House
Bill 1304 The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999 (June 22, 1999).
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those bargaining units recognized under the NLRA. 95 But if such health
care professionals are not, in fact, employees, and therefore fall outside the
scope of the NLRA, then what does the instruction to treat them as
employees engaged in concerted activities mean?
The NLRA provides protected employees with a guaranteed right to
organize and engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or for their mutual aid or protection. 96 This right is secured by
proscriptions against employer interference with the restraint or coercion
ofemployees in the exercise oftheir protected rights, including prohibitions
against the formation of company unions, employer discrimination, and
retaliation against union members. 97 Employers and employees are also
required to meet at reasonable times and to negotiate in good faith. The
NLRB is charged with ensuring that both parties comply with this
obligation, although neither party can be forced to accept any particular
provision. 98 The NLRB and the courts have outlined the subjects that are
encompassed by the duty to bargain and have designated matters pertaining
to wages, hours, and the terms and conditions of employment as mandatory
subjects of bargaining that the employer may not unilaterally change
without violating the NLRA. Most other matters are permissive subjects,
as to which there is no obligation to bargain. 99
A large body of case law, administrative rulings, and arbitration
decisions have evolved over the past sixty-seven years, which interprets and
applies these obligations in the labor law context. The result has been a
delicate balancing of the economic weapons available to each party, closely
policed by the NLRB with the threat of injunctive relief under section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act lurking in the background.
When issues arise regarding the construction of the parties' collective
bargaining contracts, the courts, and even the NLRB, largely defer to
arbitration. 100 The current labor law system is dependent on enforcement

95. H.R. 1304, 106th Cong.§ 3(a) (1999).
96. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (2002).
91. Id. § 158.
98. Id. § 155. See HK Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970) (NLRB cannot
require employer or union to agree to any substantive provision in collective bargaining
agreement).
99. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1981) (decisions with
only indirect and attenuated impact on employment are permissive subjects; decisions that almost
exclusively involve an aspect of the employer-employee relationship are mandatory subjects; and
decisions pertaining to changes in the scope and direction of the enterprise are permissive
subjects, while the effects of those changes are mandatory subjects of bargaining).
100. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960) (court will order arbitration where dispute is "susceptible to interpretation" that it falls
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and dispute resolution devices to effectuate the protections of the NLRA
in the collective negotiating process.
House Bill 1304 and the supporting testimony provided no indication as
to the application or enforcement of the duty to bargain when the parties
fall outside the scope of the NLRA regulatory structure. The Antitrust
Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care, a group of employers,
health plan providers, and other interested parties, joined the DOJ in
expressing concern over the lack of NLRB involvement in this area. The
groups observed that the exemption created by the bill would enable health
care professionals to remain independent contractors while claiming an
antitrust exemption available only to employees, and did so without
imposing any of the NLRA obligations and safeguards that apply to all
· other employees. 101 Several members of Congress expressed similar
concerns during the floor debate on House Bill 1304. 102
While recognizing that the NLRB would have no authority over
physicians' negotiations with health plan providers, the AMA contends that
such negotiations would not be entirely unregulated because the DOJ and
the FTC would continue to oversee the activities of health care
professionals. 103 House Bill 3897 adopts a different model for exempting
self-employed physicians from the antitrust laws to enable them to negotiate

within the context of the parties' agreement); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960) (arbitration award will be upheld so long as it "draws its
essence" from the contract, and arbitrator need not provide rationale for the decision); United
Paperworks v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (courts may not review merits of arbitration award, no
matter how improvident or silly).
101. Pitofsky, supra note 83; Testimony Offered by the Antitrust Coalition for Consumer
Choice in Health Care before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in
Reference to House Bill 1304 (June 22, 1999) [hereinafter Jones Statement].
102. Congressmen Boehner, Pomeroy, and Goodling observed that other groups that have
been exempted from the antitrust laws are also subject to oversight by some federal regulatory
body, such as the NLRB. 146 CONG. REC. 85630-33 (June 30, 2000). As Congressman Goodling
succinctly stated, "[i]t is a flawed labor bill because it grants rights similar to those contained in
the National Labor Relations Act, but fails to provide any mechanism to make sure those rights
are effective, or fair." 146 CONG REC. 85633 (June 30, 2000). See also 146 CONG. REc. 85637
(quoting Sen. Thomas: "What we have got are giving people the rights [of the NLRA] without the
responsibilities").
A memo drafted by the Congressional Research Service for Congressman Goodling in response
to an inquiry relating to the Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction to consider what Congressman
Goodling regarded as a labor bill observed, "though collective bargaining appears contemplated,
there is no definition or requirement of a 'duty to bargain,' no mechanism to resolve disputes that
might arise during the bargaining process, nor any enforcement mechanism to ensure good faith
bargaining, which presumably is the ultimate goal of the exercise." 146 CONG. REC. 85635 (June
30, 2000) (quoting from July 12, 1999 Congressional Research Service memo to Goodling).
103. AMA Questions and Answers, supra note 79.
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collectively with health plan providers. In lieu ofreferences to the labor law
model of collective bargaining, House Bill 3897 modifies the judicial
standard for reviewing antitrust claims asserted against physicians
collectively negotiating with health plan providers. 104 Under the antitrust
laws, such collective action would ordinarily be considered per se illegal,
without regard to whether the action has caused harm or is justified by a
reasonable business excuse. 105 A prevailing plaintiffin an action challenging
such conduct would be entitled to treble damages and attorneys fees. 106
House Bill 3897 precludes a finding of per se illegality in the case of
physicians' collective negotiations with health plan providers, and instead
provides that such collective action must be judged based on its
reasonableness, with regard to factors including "patient access to health
care, the quality of health care received by patients, and contract terms or
proposed contract terms." 107 The statute would also create a safe harbor,
limiting a plaintiff's recovery to actual (not treble) damages ifthe physicians
filed with the Attorney General written notice of their intent to negotiate
collectively, and in all cases it would preclude an award of attorneys fees
to a prevailing plaintiff absent a finding that the defendant physicians
engaged in frivolous conduct during the litigation. 108
By thus altering the standard for judicial review ofphysicians' collective
action and drastically reducing physicians' potential liability under the
antitrust laws, House Bill 3897 (like its predecessor in the I 06th Congress)
would substantially alter the legal landscape with regard to independent
physicians' ability to collectively negotiate with health insurers. House Bill
3 897 would also create a minimum of six demonstration projects, under
which participating physicians would be exempted from the antitrust laws
and allowed to collectively negotiate with health plan providers. 109 Under
three of these demonstration projects, physicians would not be subject to
any restrictions or oversight with the exception of a prohibition on
striking. 110 Under the remaining projects, the collective negotiations would
be subject to oversight by the Attorney General, who could intervene and
halt negotiations if the physicians were found to have engaged in conduct
that

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

H.R. 3897 § 3.
Id.; Northern Pacific Rwy. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
15 u.s.c. § 15.
H.R. 3897 § 2.
Id. §§ 3, 4.
Id.§ 6.
Id. § 6(d)(l)(A).
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and dispute resolution devices to effectuate the protections of the NLRA
in the collective negotiating process.
House Bill 1304 and the supporting testimony provided no indication as
to the application or enforcement of the duty to bargain when the parties
fall outside the scope of the NLRA regulatory structure. The Antitrust
Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care, a group of employers,
health plan providers, and other interested parties, joined the DOJ in
expressing concern over the lack of NLRB involvement in this area. The
groups observed that the exemption created by the bill would enable health
care professionals to remain independent contractors while claiming an
antitrust exemption available only to employees, and did so without
imposing any of the NLRA obligations and safeguards that apply to all
· other employees. 101 Several members of Congress expressed similar
concerns during the floor debate on House Bill 1304. 102
While recognizing that the NLRB would have no authority over
physicians' negotiations with health plan providers, the AMA contends that
such negotiations would not be entirely unregulated because the DOJ and
the FTC would continue to oversee the activities of health care
professionals. 103 House Bill 3897 adopts a different model for exempting
self-employed physicians from the antitrust laws to enable them to negotiate

within the context of the parties' agreement); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960) (arbitration award will be upheld so long as it "draws its
essence" from the contract, and arbitrator need not provide rationale for the decision); United
Paperworks v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (courts may not review merits of arbitration award, no
matter how improvident or silly).
101. Pitofsky, supra note 83; Testimony Offered by the Antitrust Coalition for Consumer
Choice in Health Care before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in
Reference to House Bill 1304 (June 22, 1999) [hereinafter Jones Statement].
102. Congressmen Boehner, Pomeroy, and Goodling observed that other groups that have
been exempted from the antitrust laws are also subject to oversight by some federal regulatory
body, such as the NLRB. 146 CONG. REC. H5630-33 (June 30, 2000). As Congressman Goodling
succinctly stated, "[i]t is a flawed labor bill because it grants rights similar to those contained in
the National Labor Relations Act, but fails to provide any mechanism to make sure those rights
are effective, or fair." 146 CONG REc. H5633 (June 30, 2000). See also 146 CONG. REc. H5637
(quoting Sen. Thomas: "What we have got are giving people the rights [of the NLRA] without the
responsibilities").
A memo drafted by the Congressional Research Service for Congressman Goodling in response
to an inquiry relating to the Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction to consider what Congressman
Goodling regarded as a labor bill observed, "though collective bargaining appears contemplated,
there is no definition or requirement ofa 'duty to bargain,' no mechanism to resolve disputes that
might arise during the bargaining process, nor any enforcement mechanism to ensure good faith
bargaining, which presumably is the ultimate goal of the exercise." 146 CONG. REc. H5635 (June
30, 2000) (quoting from July 12, 1999 Congressional Research Service memo to Goodling).
103. AMA Questions and Answers, supra note 79.
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collectively with health plan providers. In lieu ofreferences to the labor law
model of collective bargaining, House Bill 3897 modifies the judicial
standard for reviewing antitrust claims asserted against physicians
collectively negotiating with health plan providers. 104 Under the antitrust
laws, such collective action would ordinarily be considered per se illegal,
without regard to whether the action has caused harm or is justified by a
reasonable business excuse. 105 A prevailing plaintiffin an action challenging
such conduct would be entitled to treble damages and attorneys fees. 106
House Bill 3897 precludes a finding of per se illegality in the case of
physicians' collective negotiations with health plan providers, and instead
provides that such collective action must be judged based on its
reasonableness, with regard to factors including "patient access to health
care, the quality of health care received by patients, and contract terms or
proposed contract terms." 107 The statute would also create a safe harbor,
limiting a plaintiff's recovery to actual (not treble) damages ifthe physicians
filed with the Attorney General written notice of their intent to negotiate
collectively, and in all cases it would preclude an award of attorneys fees
to a prevailing plaintiff absent a finding that the defendant physicians
engaged in frivolous conduct during the litigation. 108
By thus altering the standard for judicial review ofphysicians' collective
action and drastically reducing physicians' potential liability under the
antitrust laws, House Bill 3897 (like its predecessor in the 106th Congress)
would substantially alter the legal landscape with regard to independent
physicians' ability to collectively negotiate with health insurers. House Bill
3897 would also create a minimum of six demonstration projects, under
which participating physicians would be exempted from the antitrust laws
and allowed to collectively negotiate with health plan providers. 109 Under
three of these demonstration projects, physicians would not be subject to
any restrictions or oversight with the exception of a prohibition on
striking. 110 Under the remaining projects, the collective negotiations would
be subject to oversight by the Attorney General, who could intervene and
halt negotiations if the physicians were found to have engaged in conduct
that

104.
JOS.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

H.R. 3897 § 3.
Id.; Northern Pacific Rwy. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
15 u.s.c. § 15.
H.R. 3897 § 2.
Id. §§3, 4.
Id.§ 6.
Id. § 6(d)(l)(A).
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was intended to substantially harm both competition and the quality of
health care received by patients. 111
The demonstration projects created by House Bill 3897 essentially
preserve the labor law collective bargaining model embodied in the 1999
legislation (House Bill 1304) on a test basis, and the antitrust amendments
loosen the legal strictures for all self-employed physicians. House Bill 3 897
has been referred to the Judiciary Committee and neither the FTC nor the
DOJ have expressed their opinions on the legislation thus far. While
preserving greater oversight than the earlier legislation, it remains unclear
whether House Bill 3897 sufficiently protects the general public from
abusive negotiating practices. Without the treble damages and attorneys fee
provisions, the costs of litigation challenging collusive practices may be
prohibitive and thereby allow all but the most egregious conduct to proceed
unchecked. As for the test projects, if they are intended to serve as a model
for the future of physician-health plan provider negotiations, it is doubtful
whether any conclusions can be drawn from a mere six examples. In the
end, the antitrust exemption sought by the AMA to "level the playing field"
could potentially grant physicians tremendous negotiating power and could
cripple the efforts of the managed care movement to control medical costs.

V. HOUSESTAFF AS EMPLOYEES AND THE BIRTH OF UNIONIZATION
Twenty-seven years ago, shortly after Congress amended the NLRA to
extend the jurisdiction of the NLRB to nonprofit healfll:care facilities·; in
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 112 a majority ofthe NLRB held housestaffintems, residents, and fellows completing their medical training at
healthcare facilities 113 - were not statutory employees because they were
primarily engaged in graduate educational training. 114 The NLRB reasoned
that the substantial amount of time spent by housestaff on direct patient
care was simply the means for effectuating the learning process and did not
qualify as traditional employment. 115 The NLRB noted that the patient care
activities were coordinated with a variety of teaching and educational
activities; and that housestaffreceived an annual stipend based on their level

111. Id. § 6(d)(l)(B).
112. 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).
113. Id. Interns are medical school graduates serving an initial period of graduate medical
training that is generally required to receive a medical licence. Residency is more advanced
training in a medical specialty, lasting from one to five years, and a clinical fellowship is
additional training to qualify for certification in a medical subspecialty. Id.
114. Id. at 253.
115. Id.
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of medical training, not on the nature of the services rendered or number of
hours spent in patient care. The NLRB further noted that the programs
were designed to allow the student to develop clinical skills in the student's
practice area and not to meet the hospital's staffing requirements; and that
the tenure of a member of the housestaff was closely related to the length
of the student's training program. 116
The NLRB reaffirmed and clarified its holding the following year in St.
Clare's Hospital & Health Center. 117 In that case, the NLRB outlined four
categories of cases involving students and placed housestaff in the fourth
category, ''that in which students perform services at their educational
institutions which are directly related to their educational program." 118 The
NLRB held that the relationship of these students to their educational
institutions is predominantly academic, not economic, and therefore is not
readily adaptable to the collective bargaining process. 119
Following Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare's, it was widely believed that
housestaff fell outside the protection of the NLRA, and that unionization
was limited to housestaff working at public hospitals who might be
considered protected under state labor laws. 120 In 1997, housestaff at
Boston Medical Center (BMC) sought to challenge that position. As a
condition to the July 1, 1996 consolidation of Boston City Hospital (a
public hospital) and Boston University Medical Center Hospital (a private
hospital) to create BMC, the Boston City Council required BMC to
recognize the House Officers' Association Committee of Interns and
Residents (the Union) as the collective bargaining representative for the 280
former Boston City Hospital housestaff. 121 BMC executed a recognition
agreement and, following a card count conducted among housestaff,
recognized the Union as the representative for all housestaff and engaged
in collective bargaining with the Union. 122 BMC's voluntary recognition
could have been withdrawn under the NLRA. To avoid such a possibility,

116. Id at 252-53.
117. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1004 (1977).
118. Id. at 1002 (citing Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976)).
119. Id.
120. Of the estimated 103,000 housestaffin the United States, only 10,000 currently belong
to unions. While protected under state collective-bargaining laws, those laws generally deny
public employees the right to strike. Richard A. Knox, MD Trainees Win the Right to Unionize
Decision in Boston Doctors' Case Affects Nation's Private Hospitals, B. GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1999,
at Al.
121. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330N.L.R.B. No. 30, slip op., at 5 (Nov. 26, 1999). Because
Boston City Hospital was a public institution, the housestaffhad been able to organize under the
Massachusetts labor laws and had been represented by a union since 1969. Id.
122. Id. at 5-6.
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the Union filed a petition with the NLRB in 1997 seeking certification of
a unit of housestaff. 123 After a hearing, the regional director dismissed the
petition based on the NLRB's holdings in Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare 's. 124
The NLRB granted requests for review submitted by both parties and
subsequently overruled Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare 's. The NLRB held that
housestaff are employees within the meaning of NLRA section 2(3 ), and
directed an election of all BMC physicians, including housestaff. 125 The
NLRB based its decision on the language of the statute, legislative history,
and experience with collective bargaining by housestaff in the public sector.
It noted that section 2(3) defines "employee" very broadly and that the
exclusions enumerated in the statute do not encompass students. 126 The
NLRB observed that the essential elements of the relationship between
housestaff and the hospital "obviously define[s] an employer-employee
relationship." 127 It cited the facts that housestaff work for an employer
· covered by the NLRA; receive compensation for services in the form of a
stipend that is subject to withholding truces; receive fringe benefits including
workers' compensation, vacations, leave time, and insurance; and spend up
to eighty percent of their time engaged in direct patient care. 128 The NLRB
held that the status of the housestaff as students "is not mutually exclusive
of a finding that they are employees" and analogized their status to that of
traditional apprentices, who have been accorded protection under the
NLRA.129
The NLRB found further support for the application of the NLRA to
housestaff in the legislative history of the 1974 Healthcare Amendments.
Prior to 1974, private, nonprofit hospitals had been exempt from the
definition of "employer" under the NLRA. 130 The NLRB noted that in
repealing that exemption, Congress was asked to consider an amendment
expressly ensuring that housestaff would not be considered "supervisors"
(who are expressly exempt under section 2(11) of the NLRA). 131 The
committee report, rejecting the proposed amendment, stated that the
designation was unnecessary since under existing NLRB decisions the
definition of supervisor did not apply to the individuals the amendment was
123. Id. at 1-2. See also Richard A. Knox, BMC Residents, Interns Vote to Unionize, B.
Dec. 22, 1999, at B4.
124. See Boston Med., 330 N.L.R.B. at 1-2.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id at 40.
127. Id. at 44.
128. Id. at 44-45.
129. Boston Med., 330 N.L.R.B. at 45.
130. Id. at 52.
13 l. Id. at 52-53.

GLOBE,

2002)

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE EUTE PROFESSIONS

291

designed to protect. 132 The NLRB reasoned that the committee report
reflected an assumption that housestaff were employees within the scope
.of the NLRA. 133 The NLRB also cited remarks from the Senate co-sponsor
and floor manager of the 1974 Healthcare Amendments referring to the
need to protect the notoriously underpaid and overworked housestaff. 134
Finally, the NLRB cited its "experience and understanding of
developments in labor relations in the intervening years since the [NLRB]
rendered" Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare 's as a basis for overruling those
precedents. 135 The NLRB noted that state courts had recognized housestaff
as employees under state labor laws, and that there was no indication that
the negative consequences of unionization predicted by earlier opinions had
actually occurred. 136 The NLRB declined to address the contours of
permissible collective bargaining between housestaff and healthcare
facilities, leaving it to the parties (in the first instance) to identify and
confront any issues of academic freedom that might arise; then if they
cannot resolve it, eventually, it will be litigated before the NLRB. 137
The contours of permissible collective bargaining remain a matter of
considerable debate following Boston Medical Center. 138 At the interim
meeting of the AMA in December 1999, the Resident and Fellow Section
approved a resolution calling on the AMA to study the effects of employee
status on education, graduate medical education funding, resident finances,
and the formation of housestaff organizations (IHOs). 139 AMA Chair Dr.
D. Ted Lewers cautioned housestaff engaged in negotiations against overly
emphasizing their employee status, to the exclusion of their academic role,
because of the potential implications of such a position on expected
Congressional legislation for the elimination of direct funding of graduate
medical education to teaching hospitals. 140
In addition to academic funding concerns, the implications of the
decision of the NLRB on the fifty or more IHOs at the nation's four

132. Id. at 53-54.
133. Id.
134. Boston Med., 330 N.L.R.B. at 54-55.
135. Id. at 59.
136. Id. at 61. The Board especially relied on the lack of any opposition by the AMA to
unionization of housestaff, with the exception of its concern that housestaff not be granted the
right to strike. Id.
137. Id. at 63.
138. Id.
139. Jay Greene, Decision "Opens Door" to Unions, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999,
available at http://www.arna-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_99/prtb 1220.htm (last visited Mar.
16, 2002).
140. Id.
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hundred major teaching institutions has sparked some discussion. IHOs are
representative organiz.ations that enable housestaff to speak as a collective
voice in addressing the issues of work hours, wages, and patient care
outside of the collective bargaining context. 141 IHO members elect
representatives to serve on Graduate Medical Education Committees and
work with medical faculty to address housestaff concerns. 142 Prior to the
decision ofthe NLRB, the AMA had worked with housestaffto form IHOs,
and had encountered opposition within the medical academic community
due to its dual role as founder and supporter of PRN. 143 That opposition
increased following Boston Medical Center as academics and even PRN
attorneys acknowledged that discussions of hospital officials with IHOs
would likely be chilled for fear that such talks would be construed by the
NLRB as voluntary recognition of the IHOs as unions. 144
PRN has announced its willingness to assist those housestaff who are
interested in the union model with union organizing. 145 While the
organiz.ation had initially intended to gear-up slowly and to gradually build
the infrastructure to compete with established organized groups, concern
that housestaff should adopt the PRN organizing model, in lieu of more
traditional unions such as the SEID-affiliated Committee of Interns and
Residents (CIR), has led PRN to act more quickly and to target its appeals
to those housestaff actively looking to organize. 146
Despite this initial wave of enthusiasm, since December 1999, when
housestaff at BMC voted to be represented by CIR, 147 housestaff at only
four other private hospitals have officially requested union representation.
Housestaff at three New York City hospitals - St. Luke's-Roosevelt

141. Jay Greene, Resident Organizing Gains Momentum, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 9, 1999,
available athttp://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_99/pr 120809.htm (last visited Mar.
18, 2002).
142. Id.
. 143 • Id. (citing the AMA' s pro-union stance, Montefiore Medical Centerrejected the AMA 's
mvolvement on behalf of eleven hundred residents seeking to fonn an IHO).
144. See id.; Greene, supra note 139.
145. Jay Greene, Residents Are Employees, NLRB Rules, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick 99/prfa1220.htm (last visited Mar.
16,2002).
146. Vida Foubister, Deans Say Residents Are Students First, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 20,
1999. CIR had begun a housestaff organizing blitz even before the Board's decision was issued
an~ has targeted its efforts on several northeast hospitals. To counter PRN's emphasis on medical
ethics and professionalism, CIR maintains that it will use strikes only as a last resort, and will
give sufficient advance notice to allow for safe transfer of patients or arrangements for alternate
care. See Laura Johannes, Medicine: Union Efforts Expected to Rise at Hospitals, NLRB Ruling
on Resident Authority to Organize Worries Administrators, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1999, at B8.
147- Boston Hospital's Union Holds Pioneering Vote, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1999, at Cl 6.
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Hospital Center in Manhattan, Our Lady of Mercy Hospital Center in the
Bronx, and Brookdale University Medical Center in Brooklyn voted to join
CIR. 148 PRN is seeking to represent approximately 170 residents and
fellows at Lutheran General Hospital in Chicago. 149
The Lutheran General housestaff cited the lack of a formal grievance
procedure, the requirement of co-payments for health insurance, low
salaries, schedule changes, and other workplace issues as motivating their
decision to organize. 150 The housestaff at St. Lukes-Roosevelt and Our
Lady of Mercy explained they had sought union representation because of
concerns about nursing and other ancillary staff cutbacks, their desire for
a voice in the delivery of patient care, and concerns about salaries, meal
costs, and other economic issues. 151 In addition to its no-strike pledge, PRN
has asserted that it will maintain a "strong and clear separation" between
contract and academic issues, 152 while CIR has not made any public
statements on this issue. In their first contract with St. Luke's-Roosevelt,
the CIR housestaff seem to have avoided academic issues, focusing on
wage and benefit issues, housing costs, and the creation of a Patient Care
Fund for the purchase of necessary equipment, educational supplies, and
other materials. 153 The other unions have not reported the successful
negotiation of a contract to date and collective bargaining issues in this
context remain largely unresolved.
VI. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A MEANS OF
ADDRESSING PATIENT CARE

The AMA attributes its unionization and legislative efforts to concerns
regarding patient care, pledging to use the union model as a means of
improving the quality of patient care while disclaiming concern over

148. Jay Greene, PRN Files Petition for Union of Residents at Illinois Hospital, AM. MED.
NEWS, Sept. 11, 2000, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_OO/
prl10911.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002); Doctors at Two New York Hospitals Vote in Favor of
Union Representation, HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA), vol. 10, No. 13, Mar. 29, 2001, at 513
[hereinafter Doctors].
149. Albert, supra note 1. The ballots from an election conducted in December 2000 remain
impounded pending the NLRB' s determination of certain challenges to the scope ofthe bargaining
unit Beckley, supra note 1; Doctors, supra note 148.
150. Greene, supra note 148; Doctors, supra note 148.
151. Albert, supra note 59.
152. Press Release, Physicians for Responsible Negotiation, PRN Offers Representation to
Chicago-Area Resident Group (Aug. 16, 2000).
153. New York Physicians Gain Right to Allocate Funds Set Aside to Improve Patient
Caregiving, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BULL. (BNA), Aug. 9, 2001, at 91.
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payments and related bread-and-butter issues. 154 Some of the patient care
issues the AMA has asserted it would seek to raise at the bargaining table
are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

"gag clauses" that prevent physicians from openly discussing
alternative treatments that are not considered "medically necessary";
patient privacy issues;
restrictive definitions ofwhat constitutes "medically necessary" care;
"de-selection of physicians who provide 'too much care"';
unreasonable administrative burdens;
requirements prohibiting physicians from selectively participating in
plans;
prohibitions on physicians refusing to take new plan participants
while accepting other new patients;
referrals to specialists;
drug formularies that restrict physicians from prescribing certain
types of medications;
limits on lengths of hospital stay;
payments for services; and
patient convenience issues. 155

With the exception of the buried references to payments and administrative
burdens, and perhaps gag clauses to the extent that they might interfere
with free speech rights, none of these issues would likely be considered to
fall within the scope of terms and conditions of employment, and they
would probably not be regarded as mandatory subjects of bargaining under
the NLRA. 156 Similarly, if labor law definitions concerning the scope of
bargaining were to apply to self-employed doctors collectively negotiating
with health plan providers, pursuant to an exemption from the antitrust
laws, the providers would not be obligated to address most of the patient
care issues identified by the AMA.
Indeed, existing unions of doctors largely refer to the AMA' s patient
care issues as matters discussed outside the collective bargaining context,
154. Bruce Japsen, Doctors Set Union Course Working Conditions, Not Money, Are Priority,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1999, at 1.
155. See AMA Questions and Answers, supra note 79; Letter from Dr. E. Ratcliffe Anderson,
Jr., to the Honorable J. Dennis Hastert (June 25, 1999), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/basic/article/201-469-0.html (on file with author); Egregious Contract Clauses, AMA
Antitrust Relief Literature, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/basic/article/201-562-0.
html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002); see also Klein, AMA to Establish, supra note 46.
156. To the extent drug formularies and definitions of"medically necessary" care pertain to
reimbursement rates, they too might be mandatory subjects.
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as to which the collective force of a union may have some persuasive force.
For example, a summary of the collective barg·aining agreements most
recently negotiated by the Doctors Council list terms relating to salaries and
benefits, job security, continuing medical education, malpractice
reimbursement, and work hours 157 - all of which are consistent with
traditional subjects of collective bargaining. In its literature supporting
unionization, the National Doctors Alliance (NDA) explains that a union
can negotiate wages, hours, benefits, due process protections, and other
conditions of employment. 158
To address patient care issues, the NDA claims that unions grant
doctors greater access to key decisionmakers in the government and
medical communities, and enable doctors to voice their concerns and
provide input on issues affecting them and their patients. 159 Patients may
also benefit indirectly from changes to workplace issues that negatively
affect patient care, such as existing "unrealistic productivity agreements
which reduce the amount of time doctors can spend with patients." 160
Similarly, the DOJ has observed that patient care issues, identified by
the AMA as the purpose for the health care professional antitrust
exemption, are not matters that collective bargaining was ever intended to
address. Collective bargaining generally focuses on improving the wages
and working conditions of union members, but is not considered to be a
means of addressing consumer safety issues. 161
The FTC, the DOJ, and other opponents of House Bill 1304 asserted in
testimony before Congress that physicians already have the legal right to
jointly present information to health plan providers regarding patient care
issues. However, the AMA asserts that this is inadequate because health
plan providers are not required to act on the information presented. 162 But
if these patient care issues are, at best, permissive subjects of bargaining,

157. Summary ofCollective Bargaining Agreement between Doctors Council (NDA) and St.
Barnabas Hospital Affiliation at Lincoln Hospital, (1999), available at www.ndaseiu.com/cb
agreement.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002); see also What's New, available at http://www.
doctorscouncil.com/articles/12-01/news.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002) (hereinafter What's New).
158. About the National Doctors Alliance/SEIU, (1999), available at http://www.ndaseiu.
com/aboutndaseiu.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
159. National Doctors Alliance, Frequently Asked Questions, (1999), available at http://
www.ndaseiu.com/aboutndaseiu.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
160. Id. Several of the most recently negotiated Doctors Council (NOA) contracts provide for
the creation of"Patient Care Committees." Although these committees provide an internal forum
to address patient care issues and concerns, NDA does not claim that unionization should be
motivated by such concerns.
161. What's New, supra note 157; Pitofsky, supra note 83.
162. See AMA Questions and Answers, supra note 79.
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then even under the NLRA health plan providers would not be required to
act on the information presented or to address those issues in a collective
bargaining agreement. In addition, the AMA' s claims of inadequacy are
undermined by its own increasingly active private sector advocacy efforts
to empower physicians in their dealings with health plan providers outside
the collective bargaining context. For example, the AMA has developed
"rapid-response teams" comprised of legal and other experts who work
with local medical societies to negotiate contracts with health plan
providers to monitor the mandatory use ofhospitalists (doctors who work
exclusively for an affiliated hospital); to spearhead the AMA' s efforts to
draw attention to the concentration of health insurance markets, in part
through development of supportive economic monopsony theories; and to
work with the FTC and the DOJ to expand the situations in which
negotiations with health plan providers would be deemed to fall outside
antitrust scrutiny. 163
The FTC has noted that these collective efforts operate within the
strictures of existing antitrust laws and enable health care professionals to
"engage in collective advocacy, both to promote the interests of their
patients and to express their opinions about other issues, such as payment
delays, dispute resolution procedures, and other matters. " 164 The American
Association of Health Plans and the Health Insurance Association of
America (which have opposed an antitrust exemption) have cited a variety
ofdevices through which doctors may negotiate collectively and strengthen
their bargaining power with health plan providers, including independent
practice associations, management service organizations, and provider
service organizations. 165 These organizations are umbrella corporations,
typically consisting of a few hundred to a few thousand self-employed
doctors, that serve as middlemen in negotiating rates for treating HMO
166
patients. As noted by the Antitrust Coalition for Consumer Choice in
Health Care, the FTC and the DOJ have issued Health Care Antitrust
Guidelines, most recently revised in 1996 to lessen restrictions on these
types of collaborative ventures.
!he AMA contends that none of these devices are adequate to protect
the mterests ofdoctors. Creating operating networks or group practices can
be costly and time-consuming, and the size and nature of such groups is
strictly confined by the Antitrust Guidelines. 167 The AMA further claims

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Klein, Board Details Discomfort, supra note 46.
Pitofsky, supra note 83.
Testimony for H.R. 1304 cited in correspondence with E. Fite.
Abate, supra note 8.
Anderson, supra note 79.
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that the Antitrust Guidelines are not entirely clear in defining the
appropriate level of integration; insurance companies can and do seize on
these ambiguities to threaten doctors with antitrust litigation, thus
undercutting their leverage. 168 The imperfect nature of these alternatives
does not appear to warrant the radical remedy of an antitrust exemption as
urged by the AMA. Nor is unionization necessary for doctors who are
employees wishing to advocate collectively on behalf of the interests of
their patients, as such conduct, within certain strictures, is fully protected
by the NLRA. 169
Ultimately, then, the rallying cry for patient care by the AMA and the
PRN seems to be a public relations device designed to win support for
unionization among those at the AMA who have historically opposed
unionization and with the general public, and is unlikely to bear much fruit
at the bargaining table. Indeed, it appears that the DOJ and the FTC are
rightly concerned with the implications of an antitrust exemption, and that
the AMA's sudden support for collective bargaining is really a device to
increase physicians' salaries at the expense of the general public.

VII. CONCLUSION
The collective bargaining model of labor negotiations has made
significant inroads within the medical community. In addition to its
traditional use for employer-employee negotiations (now expanded to
include housestaft), collective bargaining is now being touted as the
panacea for the ills of managed care. However, freed of the protections and
controls of federal labor law and the constraints of antitrust law, collective
bargaining appears most likely to benefit doctors financially. Aside from
hollow promises and empty rhetoric, there is little that government, health
plan providers, or private citizens can do to ensure that collective
bargaining focuses on patient care issues, thereby rendering the passage of
an antitrust exemption a very risky proposition.

168. Id.
169. See Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 564-66 (1978). NLRA protects collective
activity bearing some nexus to the interests of employers as employees; see also N.L.R.B. v. Int'l
Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464,477 (1953) (finding that indefensible disloyalty to employer
is not protected by NLRA).

